Gulf Governments Activate Air Defences as Iranian Strikes Enter Sovereign Airspace
The governments of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Jordan activated air defence systems this week following a fresh wave of Iranian attacks, forcing each administration to manage an acute accountability question: how to protect sovereign territory while hosting the US military presence that makes them targets in the first place.
Iran claimed its strikes hit a fuel depot in Jordan, a helicopter maintenance facility in Bahrain, fuel tanks in Kuwait and a Patriot air defence system, though these assertions remain unverified. The IRGC also stated it targeted and destroyed radar and vessel detection systems in Oman. The escalation followed US bombardments on Iran’s southern coast, including strikes on Qeshm Island and around the port cities of Bandar Abbas, Sirik and Jask.
This latest exchange comes less than a month after Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding intended to halt a conflict that began on February 28, following Israeli and US strikes on Iran. The memorandum designates Iranian control over international maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian forces have since attacked commercial vessels off Oman; the US responded by striking Iranian military positions involved in threats to shipping; Iran then fired missiles and drones at bases across the Gulf where US forces operate.
Iran has consistently claimed its attacks target only US military positions, not the Gulf states themselves. The facts on the ground tell a different story. Qatar reported that three people, including a child, sustained injuries from falling shrapnel when an Iranian missile was intercepted on Sunday. Gulf governments have repeatedly asserted their territory is not used as a launchpad for strikes on Iran, but Tehran has not accepted that assurance as grounds for restraint.
The confrontation has exposed a structural paradox for Washington’s regional partners. An estimated 50,000 US soldiers are stationed across the region, with military facilities in at least 19 locations including Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Simon Mabon, a professor of international relations at Lancaster University, framed the bind plainly: “The Gulf states are in a bind because they’re being targeted due to their relationships with the US, but their relations with the US and the presence of those bases have also meant that many of the attacks have largely been thwarted or their consequences diminished.”
Gulf countries have invested heavily in layered air defence networks combining systems from the US, Europe, and in some cases Russia, China and Israel. Saudi Arabia operates the Gulf’s largest air defence network, anchored by US-made THAAD systems and Patriot PAC-3 batteries. The UAE operates THAAD and Patriot systems alongside Israel’s Barak platform. Qatar has invested in Patriot batteries and the Norwegian-US-made NASAMS III system. Kuwait fields Patriot PAC-3 batteries, Italian Aspide launchers paired with Skyguard systems, and various short-range missiles. Bahrain recently acquired the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement system. Oman, with fewer advanced long- and medium-range systems than its neighbours, operates NASAMS, French Mistral missiles and Russian Strela-2 systems backed by anti-aircraft gun platforms.
These networks have demonstrated interception capability, though no air defence system is impenetrable.
Meanwhile, a cost asymmetry is reshaping the strategic calculus. Iran has invested heavily in domestically produced Shahed drones that can be manufactured for approximately $30,000 each. Advanced interceptor missiles cost millions of dollars. A sustained Iranian campaign could force Gulf countries and the US to expend costly and finite missiles against far cheaper incoming weapons. Mabon identified the core concern: “The biggest challenge is capacity, and that’s becoming an increasing concern, particularly the continued use of very expensive interceptor missiles against relatively cheap drones.”
Bader Mousa Al-Saif, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme and professor at Kuwait University, told Al Jazeera that Gulf states have recorded “some of the highest interception rates seen in recent months”, reflecting investment in security ties with the United States and efforts to diversify defence partnerships. He pointed to the June 25 ministerial meeting between the US and the Gulf Cooperation Council, where Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Gulf leaders reaffirmed commitment to regional security. Al-Saif suggested the cost advantage Iran currently holds may prove temporary: “We’re already seeing the defence industry respond by producing lower-cost interceptors. Over time, that will change the economics of missile defence and better match the asymmetric threats Gulf countries face, particularly from Iran.”
The current confrontation remains a “no war, no peace” scenario, with both Iran and the US engaging in calibrated escalation rather than seeking decisive military victory. Both sides are largely mirroring one another’s actions, creating space for each to replenish military stocks rather than exhaust capabilities all at once. Uncertainty surrounding US President Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy adds a further layer of institutional risk, raising questions about Washington’s willingness to maintain a costly military presence in the region over the long term.
Gulf states are accelerating military cooperation among themselves, sharing radar data, tracking missiles and aircraft across borders, coordinating warning systems and developing more integrated air defences. Mabon observed: “We’re seeing formal GCC agreements and greater cooperation. We’re also seeing diversification alongside an overreliance on the US in the hope that they could defend themselves if US involvement were reduced.” Recent defence partnerships with Ukraine, South Korea and several European countries aim at strengthening domestic defence manufacturing. Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defence pact with Pakistan in September, stating that an attack on one country is considered an attack on both. The UAE and Bahrain have deepened security ties with Israel.
Geography, however, imposes its own discipline on policy. The UAE restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022; Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise ties in 2023 under a China-brokered deal. Mabon explained the underlying logic: “Ultimately, Gulf countries can’t change geography. They have to live and work alongside Iran. They don’t want the instability that would come from the fall of the Islamic Republic. I think some Gulf states have pushed for harder strikes not to precipitate its collapse, but to weaken the more hardline elements of the IRGC.”
Restrictions on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz threaten revenues from oil and gas exports that Gulf states depend on. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are particularly exposed, as most or all of their export ports lie within the strait. Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said confidence in diplomacy to end the crisis remains low but no nation in the region “can afford another long war.” Depleted global oil inventories, which have not been replenished during the ceasefire and remain “much lower” by Parsi’s account, make a prolonged confrontation unattractive for all parties.
Qatar and Oman, despite being struck in recent days, have continued to play central roles in diplomatic efforts between Iran and the US. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has warned that renewed strikes undermine mediation efforts, but it has not abandoned the effort. The open question, as Mabon put it, is “whether this is the resumption of a longer conflict or simply another violent bout of posturing between Iran and the United States ahead of a resumption of talks,” and the answer will determine whether the governance frameworks Gulf states have built around stability, trade and open investment remain viable.