Gulf States Weigh Military Response as Iran Tolerance Wears Thin, Analyst Says

Gulf governments’ tolerance for Iranian aggression is eroding, with regional powers increasingly likely to weigh limited strikes against Tehran if provocations persist, according to Ahmed Alkhuzaie, Managing Partner at Khuzaie Associates LLC, a Washington-based consultancy tracking regional developments.

Alkhuzaie outlined the calculus facing Gulf states in remarks to The Jerusalem Post on Monday. While he characterized outright offensive operations as unlikely to be the default response, he stressed that “the possibility of limited strikes, heightened maritime patrols, or covert actions cannot be ruled out if provocations continue.”

Additional reference context is available at https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-902368.

The assessment arrives as Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps acknowledged launching attacks on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Jordan, claiming to have targeted US military facilities and assets within those countries. These strikes represent an escalation of Iranian operations that have persisted even after the Memorandum of Understanding with Washington effectively collapsed. Iran’s broader strategy to dominate the Strait of Hormuz, including attacks on commercial vessels using the Omani route and diplomatic overtures designed to coerce acceptance of Iranian control, has largely failed to achieve its objectives.

The strategic environment demands careful navigation. Alkhuzaie emphasized that regional states must “calibrate their next steps to avoid uncontrolled escalation” while simultaneously signaling that security concerns will not be dismissed. He framed the challenge as balancing deterrence against stability, ensuring that Iran recognizes “the costs of continued aggression.”

Should Gulf states move toward collective action, the Peninsula Shield Force, the joint military instrument of the Gulf Cooperation Council, would serve as the primary mechanism. This force represents more than military hardware. It embodies “political solidarity among Gulf states,” according to Alkhuzaie. The Peninsula Shield has undergone modernization over time and now encompasses ground troops, air support and naval capabilities designed to respond to regional threats, enabling coordinated responses that amplify deterrent power and signal unified resolve.

Beyond the formal GCC structure, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates command what Alkhuzaie described as “leading military powers” capable of adopting a “collective deterrent posture.” Kuwait, though traditionally cautious in its foreign policy approach, maintains a capable defensive force. The US military presence throughout the Gulf strengthens the overall security architecture. Oman’s geographic proximity to the Strait of Hormuz provides strategic advantage, while Bahrain’s hosting of the US Fifth Fleet underscores its pivotal role in maritime security.

“Together, these nations form a layered security network that extends beyond sheer military might,” Alkhuzaie stressed. “Their collective geography, commanding chokepoints, coastlines, and airspace, adds strategic weight to any potential response.” Political cohesion within the GCC, reinforced by the Peninsula Shield Force, allows even smaller states to amplify influence through collective action. This unity, combined with external partnerships, ensures that the Gulf’s deterrent posture does not depend solely on its largest members but is strengthened by all six states.

Recent developments have added complexity. Yemen’s defense ministry acknowledged that its forces targeted a runway at the Houthi-controlled Sanaa International Airport to prevent an Iranian plane from landing, though initial reports attributed the attack to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has not been among the countries directly targeted in Iran’s latest operations, though it suffered civilian casualties from Iranian aerial assaults in the past.

When asked whether an attack on Iranian proxies might represent an appropriate response without triggering wider escalation, Alkhuzaie suggested Gulf states were “heading that way.” He cited economic damage and the toll of repeated strikes, noting that regional governments cannot sustain indefinite attacks. “Our economies suffered enough… we can’t keep getting hit forever,” he said.

A contrasting perspective came from Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian analyst on Middle Eastern affairs, who told The Jerusalem Post that Gulf states would likely prove more willing to “tolerate” Iranian attacks than their public statements suggest. Their primary concern, he argued, centers on “preserving stability, investment confidence and the image that the Persian Gulf is still relatively insulated from a wider war” rather than projecting strength for its own sake.

Dehghani predicted that an open, unilateral military response by Gulf states remains unlikely. Instead, he anticipated an “indirect and layered response” involving greater coordination with the US, enhanced air defense integration, intelligence sharing and strengthened maritime security. Gulf states would probably continue channeling diplomatic pressure through Oman and Qatar while avoiding the appearance of leading a war against Iran.

Dehghani outlined a higher threshold for direct Gulf military action: large-scale casualties on Persian Gulf territory, major damage to Saudi or Emirati energy infrastructure, prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or clear evidence that US deterrence has failed. Until such conditions materialize, he expected Gulf states to allow Washington to bear most of the visible military burden while strengthening their own defenses.

Though he acknowledged that Gulf “tolerance is shrinking,” Dehghani concluded that direct Gulf leadership of a response remained unlikely, with regional governments preferring to back US actions privately. The difficult balance these states face involves needing protection from Iran while recognizing that visible alignment with a harder US-Israel security posture could increase their own exposure to Iranian retaliation. Whether that calculus shifts depends, in large part, on how far Tehran is willing to push.