Saudi Arabia Eyes Regional Security Pact as Gulf Powers Seek Iran Détente

SAUDI ARABIA POSITIONED TO LEAD GULF STATES IN NEGOTIATING NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH IRAN

On June 14, Washington and Tehran reached a framework agreement to end the war that began in late February. Three days later, President Donald Trump signed a memorandum of understanding at the Palace of Versailles. That one-page document extends the ceasefire for 60 days, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts dueling naval blockades, and halts military operations across the region, including in Lebanon. Both sides committed to negotiate harder questions in the period that follows: Iran’s nuclear program, its uranium stockpile, and sanctions relief. The agreement also commits the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, once a final deal is reached, to finance at least 300 billion dollars for Iran’s reconstruction, to gradually lift nuclear-related and unilateral sanctions, and to issue immediate waivers for Iranian oil and petrochemical exports. A binding U.N. Security Council resolution would ratify the final agreement.

For the GCC, the central question has shifted. It is no longer whether a deal is achievable, but whether the Gulf states can secure one that protects their territory, infrastructure, and economic ambitions before a broader agreement reshapes the region’s balance of power.

Limited Iranian attacks against Gulf states have continued since the framework agreement was signed. Recent strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain reinforce the urgency of a GCC-led framework to manage relations with Tehran and reduce the risk of future escalation. A non-aggression pact could help prevent Gulf territory, airspace, maritime corridors, and critical infrastructure from becoming the operating theater for Israeli, American, and Iranian escalation, though reaching one would require a coordinated GCC-wide effort.

Saudi Arabia possesses the diplomatic credentials and regional standing to advance this initiative. The kingdom has direct experience negotiating with Iran and maintains open communication channels with its leadership. Riyadh has demonstrated considerable restraint despite previous Iranian attacks on Saudi infrastructure, avoiding overt retaliation or militaristic rhetoric. That restraint positions the kingdom well to lead a GCC-wide negotiation while bringing in other stakeholders, including China, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Egypt. Reports suggest Saudi Arabia has already begun consulting Gulf partners and European actors to pursue this direction.

What might such an agreement contain? While details of Saudi Arabia’s reported proposal remain unpublished, it is reportedly modeled on the Helsinki Agreement, which laid the foundation for Cold War détente between the Soviet Union and Western countries in 1975. A non-aggression pact would likely be a limited, security-focused agreement confined to the Gulf and adjacent areas, establishing a baseline for GCC-Iran relations through a series of mutual assurances. Gulf states would reaffirm that their territory and airspace will not be used to support offensive operations against Iran, while Tehran would commit not to target Gulf states, their energy and civilian infrastructure, ports, or maritime corridors.

Three critical issues would need to be addressed. Territorial restraint would prohibit physical, cyber, or proxy attacks against either side’s territory and critical infrastructure. Maritime restraint would ban harassment, seizure, mining, or attacks on shipping through any Gulf-administered waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab al-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. Crisis management would establish a dedicated deconfliction and de-escalation channel, supported by regional mediators such as Oman and Qatar and expandable to other signatories, to address potential violations before they escalate.

One likely gray area involves digital infrastructure, particularly data centers. Tehran argues that Gulf-based data centers support U.S. military targeting and surveillance operations against Iran. For GCC states, AI infrastructure is a cornerstone of their economic transformation strategies and a major red line. The agreement would not require political reconciliation or strategic trust as a precondition. Rather, it would establish a narrow framework for near-term mutual restraint while leaving the region’s deeper security disputes unresolved. Iran would continue its rivalry with the United States and Israel, while Saudi Arabia and the GCC would retain their security partnerships with Washington. Issues such as U.S. military basing, the GCC’s continued dependence on the U.S. security umbrella, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Tehran’s support for proxy groups, and Iranian missile and drone capabilities would still need to be negotiated through this or parallel platforms.

A GCC-Iran non-aggression pact could provide Saudi Arabia with three strategic benefits. First, it would allow Riyadh to reassert leadership within the GCC and the broader region by freezing the kinetic dimension of the conflict and creating space for renewed Saudi-UAE cooperation. This would require sustained outreach between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi to de-escalate their areas of competition while establishing a common framework for engaging Iran. If there is a guaranteed reduction in attacks from Iran, the UAE is more likely to support such a deal, especially if it includes a framework for managing the Strait of Hormuz.

Second, a non-aggression pact would reduce the economic costs of a prolonged conflict. Gulf states’ domestic transformation agendas depend on regional stability, and the deterioration in Saudi-UAE coordination has only heightened Abu Dhabi’s insecurity. Israel has sought to exploit that insecurity by positioning itself as a key security partner to the UAE, widening the gap between the Gulf’s two largest economies. Yet Riyadh and Abu Dhabi still share an interest in preventing the Gulf from being viewed as a permanent conflict zone. Sustained instability would undermine investor confidence and raise the cost of every major transformation project in the region.

Third, a non-aggression pact could shift the Saudi-Iran rivalry from military confrontation back to geoeconomic competition. Saudi Arabia will not compete with Iran in open combat, as the potential losses would jeopardize Vision 2030 and the broader diversification agenda that underpins regime legitimacy. A return to peacetime competition, by contrast, would allow Riyadh to compete with Tehran through economic and diplomatic statecraft, particularly if U.S. and U.N. sanctions continue to constrain Iran’s economy.

Several potential barriers could impede success. Israel’s leadership could disrupt any Gulf-Iran de-escalation track. Netanyahu’s government has continued to treat perpetual war with Iran as politically useful, despite recent polling suggesting military action has not delivered the political dividends the coalition expected ahead of the October 2026 Israeli elections. Trump reinforced this dynamic by linking a U.S.-brokered ceasefire with Iran to Gulf normalization with Israel, telling Arab leaders he expected them to normalize relations in exchange for a ceasefire deal. Normalization remains a non-starter for Saudi Arabia and the other non-signatory Gulf states of the Abraham Accords, which continue to condition normalization on an irreversible path to Palestinian statehood. If Israel retains the ability to restart strikes at will, any Gulf-Iran understanding would remain fragile.

Iran could also undermine a non-aggression pact through selective escalation. Tehran may read Gulf restraint as evidence that its threat posture is working and sustain selective strikes to preserve that leverage. Gulf states would then be forced to choose between continued restraint and the use of force to restore deterrence, the same dilemma they already face. A non-aggression framework requires Iran to view Gulf restraint as a voluntary accommodation rather than the product of successful coercion. Any agreement would therefore require a clear, agreed-upon response to possible Iranian violations.

Intra-GCC fragmentation poses a third risk. The UAE-Saudi schism could undermine the coordination a non-aggression pact would require. Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have signaled support for de-escalation once a legitimate U.S.-Iran ceasefire is on the table, and the memorandum of understanding now satisfies that condition. The remaining question is whether they can convert that shared support into a common negotiating position before the 60-day window closes. Without a coordinated GCC approach, Iran and Israel could exploit Gulf divisions, leaving the bloc unable to function as a coherent diplomatic actor.

A GCC-Iran non-aggression pact will not end the war. It might, however, take the Gulf states out of it. If the Gulf waits for Washington and Tehran to settle the larger questions before defining its own terms, it will inherit whatever bargain they strike, and lose the chance to shape one that protects Gulf interests.