For 8,000 Pakistani Troops in Saudi Arabia, the Pact Is Real

For the roughly 8,000 Pakistani troops now stationed in Saudi Arabia, the Mecca Pact is no longer a document on paper. It is a deployment. The force includes about 16 JF-17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons, and a Chinese-made HQ-9 air-defense system, and it could grow to as many as 80,000 personnel if Riyadh invokes the full scope of the agreement. On Oct. 5, the three signatory states formally moved to the practical implementation of their collective-defense commitments, authorizing measures to provide agreed military forces and ensure their rapid deployment to the Kingdom. Two days later, Pakistani Air Force jets were reportedly taking part in strikes against Houthi missile and drone threats. Islamabad denied the claim, saying only that Pakistani forces were in the kingdom in multiple capabilities. For the soldiers, pilots, and support staff involved, the distinction between training mission and combat role is the most immediate question the pact has ever posed.

That human reality sits at the center of what analysts Muhib Rahman and Nazmus Sakib describe, in a War on the Rocks essay (https://warontherocks.com/the-mecca-pact-and-pakistans-bid-to-become-indispensable/), as Pakistan’s most serious attempt yet to break a familiar cycle. For most of its history, the country’s geopolitical value has risen and fallen with other nations’ emergencies. The pact, signed with Saudi Arabia on Sept. 17, 2025, and joined by Turkey in August 2026, is designed to change that by locking a decades-old informal security relationship into a standing institution.

The people who built it moved quickly. On Aug. 31, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey established a secretariat in Saudi Arabia for the Mecca Defence Agreement, with a Pakistani serving as the first secretary-general for a three-year term. The three states outlined cooperation in air defense, drones, electronic warfare, and joint defense production. The arrangement connects Saudi financial resources and Gulf influence, Turkish defense industrial capacity and NATO experience, and Pakistan’s large military, nuclear status, and long regional security ties.

The history behind those ties is long. Pakistani troops served in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s, and Pakistani forces helped protect Saudi territory during the 1990 to 1991 Gulf crisis. Riyadh, in turn, repeatedly provided Islamabad with oil facilities, loans, and financial support during economic distress. Saudi financing gives Riyadh leverage, but Pakistan’s ability to supply military personnel, training, and air defense helps offset that asymmetry.

Meanwhile, the pact’s activation came amid escalating Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia. Turkey has also agreed to send technical and defensive support. A senior Pakistani military official has mentioned that Pakistani jets are used in strikes against the Houthis. If confirmed, this would mark a reversal of Pakistan’s refusal to join the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015, despite Saudi requests and economic support. Reports of involvement in airstrikes, followed by officials describing the role as defensive, affirming no ground deployment, and publicly denying participation in the strikes, suggest what a calibrated posture looks like: a force present enough to satisfy the commitment, positioned conservatively enough to avoid upsetting Pakistan’s relationship with Iran, a relationship constrained by domestic sectarian sensitivities and the risk of being pulled into Gulf rivalries.

That balancing act reflects the broader opening Pakistan is trying to convert into permanence. The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis renewed Washington’s attention, with the United States directly involved in ceasefire efforts and President Donald Trump hosting Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, at the White House. The war with Iran widened that opening. Islamabad emerged as a key intermediary between Washington and Tehran and played a crucial role in the preliminary ceasefire and negotiating framework in June 2026. Iranian attacks on Gulf states, Israeli attacks on Qatar, and disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz increased Gulf demand for deterrence, making Pakistan’s regional relationships more valuable. Islamabad has sought economic returns, including a request for $10 billion in U.S.-backed exchange stabilization support, a reminder of the economic vulnerability that drives the entire strategy.

The nuclear question remains unresolved. Neither side has announced a Pakistani nuclear guarantee, and the ambiguity allows Riyadh to signal a hedge against the Iranian nuclear program without an explicit arrangement, while Islamabad accrues returns without a defined obligation. The United States signed a Section 123 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia on July 22, possibly indicating greater flexibility toward Saudi nuclear ambitions.

By contrast with past efforts, the pact faces real tests but also real differences. Analysts note credibility gaps in interoperability and threat perception, though among middle powers complementary capabilities and a division of labor can matter as much as shared doctrine. The regional record is poor: the Arab League’s 1950 Joint Defence Treaty, the Peninsula Shield Force, and the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition all failed to produce durable capacity. What distinguishes the Mecca Pact is that it is not driven by a single conflict and is not crowded by competing Arab powers. Ankara’s participation raises unresolved questions about how NATO obligations and U.S. export controls on defense technology would intersect with trilateral production. An Iranian parliamentarian warned two days after the signing that an attack originating from any of the three states would draw a response without qualification. And an India-Pakistan contingency would be a hard test, since Saudi Arabia has strong incentives for restraint given its ties with New Delhi, though support could take forms short of combat, from arms and intelligence to logistics and diplomatic coordination.

The pact is also partly Pakistan’s answer to India’s expanding influence in the Gulf, which rests on economic scale Pakistan cannot match. Pakistan instead offers battle-tested military capability, mediation across rival capitals, and channels to Washington, Beijing, Riyadh, Tehran, and Ankara at once. For the United States, the arrangement functions as an additional layer of burden-sharing within the existing order rather than a replacement for it, though it gives partners more room to maneuver without Washington.

For the people whose careers, deployments, and communities now depend on it, the pact’s promise is simple: that the next emergency will not be the only reason anyone needs them. Whether the secretariat, the combined planning, and the defense-industrial cooperation can outlast the current crises will decide if that promise holds.