BEIJING’S LEVERAGE OVER TEHRAN FACES REAL LIMITS, GULF STATES DISCOVER
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi has conducted dozens of calls and meetings with regional counterparts since the conflict intensified, yet the fundamental question confronting Gulf Arab governments is not how active Beijing has been, but how much it is actually willing to do. As Iran and its allies threaten critical shipping routes, the six Gulf Cooperation Council states are testing whether Beijing can, or will, use its position as Iran’s largest trading partner to force Tehran toward de-escalation.
The conflict escalated sharply after U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, creating mounting pressure on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The war has damaged their regional adversary but simultaneously restricted vital energy exports and exposed them to direct threats. Iran and its allies have targeted both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb waterway in the Red Sea, choking off commerce that flows through these passages.
Frustrated by the limits of American power in containing these threats, Gulf sources say their governments have turned to Beijing as an alternative pressure point. Special envoy Zhai Jun has traveled to Gulf Arab capitals and Tehran. The Chinese foreign ministry, responding to inquiries, stated that “China has maintained close communication with all parties, and has consistently worked to stop the fighting and promote peace.”
China’s structural position complicates that role. Beijing buys oil from across the Gulf while serving as Iran’s biggest trading partner, a dual relationship that creates both opportunity and constraint. One Gulf source explained the dynamic plainly: “There’s huge respect between the Gulf and China and they are a big trading partner, so any issue is raised in a very quiet manner.” That deference reflects economic interdependence that has deepened since a 2022 Gulf-China summit, with another summit planned for Riyadh this year, though not yet confirmed.
The limits of that leverage have become apparent. Beijing has refrained from publicly challenging Tehran’s threats to shipping. A second Gulf source acknowledged the gap between expectation and reality: “The Chinese are trying to be more involved, they are trying to be more helpful. But China has turned out not to be as influential as we thought, whether that is a lack of will or a lack of capacity is debatable. What seems to happen when America enters the fray is that superpower calculations dominate over everything else.”
Henry Tugendhat, a China specialist at the Washington Institute, attributed Beijing’s caution to a fundamental strategic choice: China prioritizes preserving relationships across the region over the diplomatic risk of openly siding with either camp. Once Washington became directly involved, Chinese calculations expanded beyond Gulf interests alone to encompass broader U.S.-China rivalry.
One source with direct knowledge of China’s regional discussions articulated the core constraint: “Gulf governments can buy Chinese technology, investment and drones, but what they cannot buy is Chinese leverage that operates independently of (its relations with) Washington.” That dependency grew more acute as President Xi Jinping prepared for talks with President Donald Trump scheduled for Sept. 24, during which China’s four-point proposal for Middle East peace and stability would likely feature.
By contrast, where Beijing has acted, the results have been narrow and largely self-serving. In 2023, China brokered a surprise rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, an achievement now being tested by the current conflict. More recently, China pushed Pakistan to mediate between Washington and Tehran to resume peace talks, according to three Pakistani sources. The foreign ministry stated that China would “play an active role in restoring peace and tranquillity in the Middle East Gulf region as soon as possible.”
Direct negotiations with Yemen’s Houthi movement represent another dimension of Chinese diplomacy. Six sources with knowledge of the matter said China held talks with the Iran-aligned militia to enable Chinese tankers to transit the southern Red Sea without attack, following Houthi pledges to restrict Saudi port access. China’s transport ministry did not respond to requests for comment on these arrangements.
Anna Borshchevskaya, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, assessed the visible results as narrow and self-interested. “Beyond narrow bilateral arrangements that helped shield Chinese-linked shipping, it’s hard to see what else China has been able or willing to achieve,” she said. She argued that the conflict has allowed China to protect its own interests while international energy price rises create political pressure on U.S. and European leaders.
China has benefited from steep discounts on Iranian oil resulting from international sanctions. Over time, Beijing has increased support for Iranian security through dual-use components, chip equipment and satellite navigation systems, though it has avoided overtly providing military aid since the war began. Iran, for its part, has maintained that it will keep control over the Strait of Hormuz, citing past attacks during nuclear negotiations that the U.S. and Israel have vowed to dismantle.
Gulf governments ultimately hope Beijing will steer Tehran toward a negotiated settlement. Sources acknowledge that China moves slowly and cautiously. The harder question, left open by every conversation in Gulf capitals, is whether a prolonged war may also serve Chinese interests by intensifying pressure on the United States, making restraint in Beijing not a failure of capacity but a matter of calculated patience.