Kuwait’s ratification of a 2023 defense cooperation agreement on July 26 marks the latest formal step in a deepening security architecture between Pakistan and the Gulf Arab states, one that carries consequences well beyond the bilateral arrangements themselves.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have both moved to institutionalize defense relationships with Islamabad. Kuwait’s ratification came alongside discussions on a broader defense partnership, building on Pakistan’s existing mutual defense pact with Riyadh, under which Islamabad has already stationed thousands of troops, fighter aircraft, and air defense units in the kingdom. The acceleration of these ties coincides with escalating Iranian and Houthi attacks on Gulf shipping and energy infrastructure, creating what Gulf states perceive as a security vacuum left by uncertainty over the durability of U.S. security guarantees.
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Amin Tarzi, professor of strategic studies and chair of Middle East studies at the Marine Corps War College in Quantico, Virginia, frames the development in pointed terms. “It is very significant and symbolic that you have the second most populous Muslim country, and the only one that has nuclear weapons, now joining the defense of other Muslim countries,” Tarzi said. The positioning of a nuclear-armed state as a Gulf security provider carries weight that extends well beyond raw military capability.
Pakistan’s expanded role, however, introduces complications that officials in Islamabad must navigate with care. The country shares a volatile 600-mile border with Iran across the Balochistan region, where both nations have battled separatist insurgencies for decades. Tensions escalated sharply in early 2024 when Iran and Pakistan exchanged cross-border strikes, each claiming to have targeted militants operating from the other’s territory. By year’s end, the two governments reached a quiet understanding on managing cross-border militancy, with Pakistan handing over a senior Jaish al-Adl figure while Iran transferred a prominent Baluch nationalist ideologue to Islamabad.
Pakistan’s willingness to take a firmer stance against Iran-backed Houthis now threatens to complicate that fragile equilibrium. When the Houthis announced a blockade of commercial shipping bound for Saudi Arabia last week, Islamabad declared that it “reserves its right to take all necessary measures, including lawful use of force, in the exercise of self-defense to protect its maritime assets and national interests.” Reporting from alhurra.com notes that even limited Pakistani military responses could raise tensions along the two countries’ shared border, complicating Iran’s security calculations.
Tehran, for its part, has so far held back. Farzan Sabet, an Iran expert at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told MBN that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has engaged in risk-taking behavior towards Pakistan before, but it has taken a more restrained stance toward Pakistan now, even if it acts against the Houthis.” That restraint, Sabet argues, reflects a broader Iranian calculation. “For the time being, Tehran would prefer not to open another front against adversaries that can do significant damage to it, like Israel or Pakistan.”
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s domestic pressures constrain how far Islamabad can extend its Gulf commitments. A country of 240 million, it faces deadly insurgencies, a frozen relationship with India, tensions with Afghanistan, and instability along its southeastern border with Iran. These competing demands set a practical ceiling on what any Pakistani government can realistically pledge abroad.
Gulf analysts are careful to define the scope of the partnership. Khaled M. Batarfi, a Saudi commentator based in Jeddah, characterized Riyadh’s arrangement with Pakistan as “a defensive partnership aimed at strengthening deterrence and regional stability” rather than an alliance explicitly targeting Iran. “Riyadh views Pakistan as an important partner within a diversified security framework, not as a substitute for Saudi Arabia’s own capabilities or its other international partnerships,” Batarfi said. He added that Pakistani participation in offensive military operations inside Iran is “highly unlikely except under the most extraordinary circumstances.”
In Kuwait, Gulf security scholar Zafer M. Alajmi described the cooperation as transactional. Islamabad, he noted, expects investment in energy and infrastructure alongside employment opportunities for Pakistani workers. “Any Pakistani commitment would likely be limited to training, air defense, and military equipment, rather than the deployment of large combat forces,” Alajmi said. Kuwait nonetheless hopes to replicate Saudi Arabia’s mutual defense arrangement, seeking air defense systems, fighter aircraft, and armed drones.
Asfandyar Mir, a South Asia analyst at the Stimson Center in Washington, sees Pakistan’s expanding role as partly enabled by Washington’s effort to reduce its own military footprint in the region. “If Pakistan can step up in a way that backfills some of the security roles that the U.S. can offload or not take on additional responsibilities, it will be a welcome development,” Mir said. He cautioned that Islamabad is likely to limit defense cooperation beyond Saudi Arabia, with any expansion elsewhere in the Gulf proceeding gradually.
Pakistan’s broader strategic calculus extends beyond the Gulf itself. By strengthening its regional influence, Islamabad hopes to break out of a strategic deadlock with India, whose relations with Pakistan have remained frozen since the May 2025 military confrontation that brought the nuclear-armed rivals to the brink of war. Tarzi put it plainly: “Pakistan most likely is trying to get out of being stuck in a situation of only looking east towards India. It would rather become a more regional power.” Whether the Gulf’s formal defense agreements give Islamabad the leverage to achieve that remains the open question.