Gulf States Weigh Security Alternatives as US Shifts Middle East Focus

GULF STATES REASSESS SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS AFTER US-IRAN CONFLICT

Trump’s National Security Strategy, released last year, declared that Washington no longer views the Middle East as a geopolitical priority, and the fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran is now turning that declaration into a lived reality for Gulf Cooperation Council governments. Regional analysts say the conflict, which erupted on February 28, has exposed vulnerabilities in the security architecture that has anchored Gulf state strategy for decades, forcing a fundamental reassessment of long-standing reliance on American guarantees.

Iranian military forces launched missiles and drones at targets across the Arabian Peninsula, striking military bases hosting US troops alongside civilian infrastructure including airports, energy facilities and hotels in several Gulf countries. Even after Tehran and Washington reached a memorandum of understanding to end the war earlier this month, Iranian strikes continued against Bahrain and Kuwait in subsequent skirmishes with US forces. The attacks made the accountability question unavoidable: if American bases became targets rather than deterrents, what exactly are the security commitments worth?

Anna Jacobs Khalaf, a non-resident fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute, characterized the situation as an “unprecedented security crisis” for GCC members. She told Al Jazeera that the combined effect of US and Israeli military actions against Iran, along with Tehran’s retaliation that included shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, has convinced some regional capitals to shift away from what she called a “US-centric security architecture.”

Annelle Sheline, a research fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, was more direct. US forces proved “unreliable” in preventing Iran’s attacks, she told Al Jazeera, and the presence of American military installations in Gulf countries became counterproductive, turning assets into liabilities.

The diversification of security partnerships was already underway before the conflict began. Saudi Arabia signed a defence pact with Pakistan ahead of the war, an alliance analysts expect could expand to include other regional players. Gulf states have for years purchased defence systems from European countries while maintaining cordial relations with Russia and China. That multifaceted approach is likely to accelerate, experts say. Khalaf emphasized that seeking new partners does not mean abandoning the United States entirely. The emerging strategy, she said, focuses on “regional balance of power and pushing back on both Iran and Israel,” involving diversified partnerships, regional platforms such as the so-called quad group comprising Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, and the development of domestic defensive capabilities.

Beyond military arrangements, Gulf states are exploring economic interdependence with Iran as a potential stabilizing mechanism. Several GCC governments have maintained lines of communication with Tehran and are moving to deepen economic relations across the Gulf. Sheline argued that intertwined economic interests could prove more effective than weapons in deterring future attacks. “If Gulf and Iranian economic interests are intertwined, Tehran would think twice before striking the region,” she said.

Vice President JD Vance recently alluded to precisely this dynamic. Speaking to UnHerd, he noted that Gulf countries have welcomed the memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, and that the United Arab Emirates, which he described as “by far the most hawkish, by far the most pro-Israel country in the GCC,” is now holding conversations with Iranians that have never occurred before. Those discussions, Vance said, include talks with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps about economic incentives and investment conditions that could make Iran more attractive to Gulf capital.

Meanwhile, the United States maintains longstanding political and security commitments to Israel, creating a complicating obstacle to sustained diplomatic progress. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declined to abide by the memorandum’s demands for a regional ceasefire, including in Lebanon. Israeli allies in Washington mobilized against the diplomatic agreement almost immediately after it was signed. The Trump administration has navigated these tensions by backing a separate agreement between Lebanon and Israel that effectively grants Israel considerable freedom of action in Lebanon until Hezbollah disarms, an arrangement that appears inconsistent with the memorandum’s ceasefire provisions. Netanyahu has struck a balance by repeatedly thanking Trump for the war with Iran while insisting that Israel will pursue its own policies in Lebanon and beyond.

For Gulf governments, Israel’s military conduct has become a governance concern in its own right. The 2025 bombing of Doha, Qatar’s capital, during US-backed Gaza ceasefire mediations brought that threat into sharp relief. President Trump stated he was “very unhappy” with those strikes and denied approving or having prior knowledge of the attack. Khalaf noted that Israel’s destruction in Gaza since October 7, its expanding occupation of Palestinian lands, and its attacks on Lebanon and Syrian territory are viewed as “hugely threatening and unacceptable” to all Gulf states, including those that have normalized relations with Israel.

The critical variable, Sheline said, is whether the Trump administration will apply pressure on the Netanyahu government to prevent it from undermining the memorandum. If it does, regional countries may finally assume greater responsibility for their own security. If it does not, Israel risks acting as a spoiler, generating tensions that pull Washington back into conflicts it has formally declared it no longer wishes to prioritize.